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“evidence of balance of power behavior
in Latin America in the post–Cold War
period.” Get the point?
The editors try to salvage something
from this muddle by some fanciful ad
hoc theorizing, in particular pressing us
to accept the notion of “soft balancing,”
which basically translates into arguing
that almost any opposition to a coun-
try’s policies or actions constitutes bal-
ancing behavior. The most vigorous
effort to salvage balance-of-power theory
from history’s dustbin is Christopher
Layne’s unapologetic realism, which,
while finding little empirical evidence
for balancing, nevertheless boldly pre-
dicts that it is “a pretty safe bet” that
the United States “will not be able to es-
cape the fates of previous contenders
for hegemony.” This is a bet based on
faith, not fact. The other believer is
Robert Ross, who contends that “bal-
ance of power politics has been espe-
cially pronounced in East Asia.” What
is extraordinary about Ross’s essay is
that it ignores the implications of
China’s economic growth, its integra-
tion into the world economic system,
and its escalating interdependence with
those against whom it is presumably
balancing.
Overall, this is a book of missed oppor-
tunities. Perhaps the most important is
its failure to come to grips with the sub-
jective dimension of global politics. Au-
thors repeatedly and positively invoke
Stephen Walt’s modification of balance-
of-power theory with the addition of
threat perception but fail to recognize
its importance in directing our atten-
tion to the centrality of ideas and per-
ceptions. There are hints, however, as
when Lemke discusses the key role of
the “distribution of attitudes” and
Wirtz alludes to “divergence in
perception.” Only Rhodes captures the
critical role played by the social con-
struction and reconstruction of ideas in
the declining relevance of balance of
power. In an essay that deserves greater
attention than it will receive in this vol-
ume, Rhodes succinctly captures the
degree to which balance of power has
been made obsolete by the disappear-
ance of trinitarian warfare. In the end,
we conclude with him that it “is simply
ludicrous” to assume that “every state
lives in fear of the imperial ambitions of
every other state in the present age.”
RICHARD MANSBACH
Department of Political Science
Iowa State University
Haldi, Stacy Bergstrom. Why Wars Widen: A The-
ory of Predation and Balancing. London: Frank
Cass, 2003. 198pp. $114.95
Why Wars Widen is a theoretical and
empirical analysis of why neutral states
choose to enter an ongoing great-power
war. Most international-relations schol-
arship neglects this question, choosing
instead to explain the origins of war.
Haldi, of both the Naval War College
and Gettysburg College, opens her book
with the observation that states entering
an ongoing conflict “may have interests
and policies entirely distinct from those
of the initial combatants.” The book
seeks to reveal these interests. Chapters
1 and 2 introduce the argument that
neutrals are most likely to widen great-
power wars in eras of low political cost,
when war is limited and less threaten-
ing to state survival. Moreover, when
political cost is low, widening a war is
likely to occur for predatory reasons or
to acquire strategic assets that will
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enhance national power. In contrast,
neutrals are less likely to widen wars
when the political cost of war is high. In
these eras, when wars threaten a state’s
survival, neutrals will tend to use ongo-
ing wars to balance against an adverse
shift in the distribution of power, but
only after all other balancing options
have been exhausted. The remaining
chapters test this argument against al-
ternative explanations, alliances and of-
fense dominance, and offer predictions
for the likelihood of war widening in
the contemporary international system.
Haldi’s study encompasses great-power
wars between 1700 and 1973, with a fo-
cus on the Seven Years’ War, the French
Revolutionary War, the Napoleonic
Wars, the Crimean War, and World
War I. Additional cases of great-power
wars susceptible to widening are in-
cluded in an appendix. Prior to the Na-
poleonic Wars, the political cost of war
was low, Haldi argues, because armies
were costly to maintain and soldiers
were not expendable. Thus predatory-
war widening became more frequent in
this era. However, political and social
changes that occurred alongside the
French Revolutionary War and the Na-
poleonic Wars reduced these costs, al-
lowing France to introduce an era of
unlimited wars that sought the enemy’s
total destruction. From that point for-
ward, Haldi maintains, the political cost
of war was high and balancing-war wid-
ening tended to be more prevalent. Per-
haps the greatest strength of this
analysis is that each case study exam-
ines the motivations of states that en-
tered ongoing wars, as well as those that
could have but did not. The author
concludes that the war-widening theory
explains each incidence of widening
much better than the competing
theories can and may even lend insight
into the likelihood of contemporary
war widening.
The greatest appeal of this work is its
attempt to delve into the largely ne-
glected area of international-relations
theory. However, it suffers from two se-
rious flaws. First, it attempts to cover a
lot of material succinctly, resulting in
insufficiently explained references to
history and theory, including the con-
cept of great-power war, which is cen-
tral to the author’s argument. A deeper
analysis of the alternative theories of
alliances and offense dominance would
also have been more satisfying. This
deficiency makes the work most appro-
priate for graduate students and re-
searchers already familiar with the
terrain. The subject matter is interest-
ing, but the author could have attracted
a broader audience if she had analyzed
her work in greater depth. Second, the
contemporary relevance of Haldi’s pol-
icy implications is unconvincing. Her
conclusions drawn from European
great-power wars are not clearly appli-
cable to the contemporary international
system, simply because the threat of
such wars, let alone war widening, is
negligible. Moreover, because future
occurrences of great-power war widen-
ing will probably include at least one
nuclear power, nuclear weapons should
definitely be considered more systemat-
ically if Haldi’s predictions are to carry
any weight. These concerns might have
possibly been overcome by including an
analysis of the Korean or Vietnam
wars—two cases found in the appendix—
or perhaps an even more contemporary
conflict like the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
Despite these limitations, serious stu-
dents of interstate warfare will find this
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work a useful entry into the question of
why wars widen.
KIRSTEN RAFFERTY
Department of Government and International
Studies
Berry College
Roberts, Paul. The End of Oil: On the Edge of a
Perilous New World. New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 2004. 386pp. $26
By 2025 world energy demand is ex-
pected to increase by 54 percent. Oil
and natural gas consumption is ex-
pected to increase 57 and 68 percent,
respectively, by then. Total energy con-
sumption in 2025 for China, India, and
South Korea is predicted to equal that
of the United States. What do these fig-
ures really tell us about today’s energy
economy? The answers can be found in
The End of Oil, in which Paul Roberts
superbly navigates the complex topic of
energy and explains how energy has
become the currency of political and
economic power. Roberts’s argument
centers on three key points: “that en-
ergy is the single most important re-
source, that our current energy
economy is failing, and that the shape
of the next energy economy is being de-
cided right now—with or without our
input.” The author’s hope is that The
End of Oil will provide nonexperts with
a way to begin to think about energy.
The End of Oil is broken down into
three parts. Part 1 explains how and
why energy has become central to hu-
man existence. Part 2 examines the
mechanics of the energy order. This
section contains excellent discussions
on consumption, the current
transformation of the oil and natural
gas industries, alternate fuels, and con-
servation. Part 3 looks at the promise
and peril of the world’s energy future; it
includes a valuable discussion on en-
ergy security. Roberts concludes with a
look at how the world could transition
to a new energy economy based on cur-
rent trends.
Several important implications emerge
from Roberts’s analysis. First, the cur-
rent energy system is failing to keep up
with current demand. As the develop-
ing world tries to catch up with the de-
veloped world, the demand for energy
will continue to increase regardless of
what happens with population and en-
ergy technology. In the future, the issue
may not be whether the world is pro-
ducing the right type of energy but
whether it can produce enough. Sec-
ond, there may be real limits to our
ability to produce ever-increasing vol-
umes of energy. If this is true, then we
will need to radically rethink how we
consume and produce energy. Third,
the sooner we start to transform the
current energy economy, the more time
there will be to assess options and tech-
nologies. Fourth, the world cannot po-
litically or economically shift from a
hydrocarbon-based energy economy to
a new energy economy overnight. Dur-
ing the transition, the world will need
to develop a transition, or “bridge,” en-
ergy economy. A bridge economy will
give markets and society the flexibility
and opportunity to phase out the worst
of current trends while creating a new
energy system. According to Roberts,
such an economy will likely require sig-
nificant improvements in energy effi-
ciency, and an increased reliance on
natural gas. Fifth, America’s energy
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